Monthly Archives: July 2013

AUXENCIO JOSEPH B. CLEMENTE v. ERWIN E. BAUTISTA, A.M. No. P-10-2879, June 03, 2013

Administrative Law; Penalty. Under the Civil Service Rules, the penalty that should be imposed on an employee who is guilty of two or more offenses is that corresponding to the most serious offense. The rest of the offenses shall be considered as aggravating circumstances only.

Full text here.

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PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. LEANDRO LEGASPI, G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013

Labor Law; Finality of NLRC’s decisions, resolutions and orders; Petition for Certiorari, Not Moot. Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said period. In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, however, it was ruled that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.

Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65. It has, thus, been held that the CA’s review of the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65, particularly those which have already been executed, does not affect their statutory finality.

Xxx in Leonis Navigation, after the NLRC resolution awarding disability benefits became final and executory, the employer paid the monetary award to the employee. The CA dismissed the employer’s petition for certiorari, ruling that the final and executory decisions or resolutions of the NLRC rendered appeals to superior courts moot and academic. This Court disagreed with the CA and held that final and executed decisions of the NLRC did not prevent the CA from reviewing the same under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was further ruled that the employee was estopped from claiming that the case was closed and terminated, considering that the employee’s Acknowledgment Receipt stated that such was without prejudice to the final outcome of the petition for certiorari pending before the CA.

Full text here.

ALPS TRANSPORTATION v. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 186732, June 13, 2013

Labor Law; Remedies of illegally dismissed employees. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of full backwages. In Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, we explained:

The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and, secondly, the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. Reinstatement restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin remedies — reinstatement and payment of backwages — make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment. Thus, do these two remedies give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure.

Full text here.

AMANDO P. CONTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), ET AL., GR. NO. 187896-97, June 10, 2013

Remedial Law;  Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman. We ruled in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.

Full text here.

SPOUSES DELFIN TUMIBA, ET AL. v. SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, ET AL., G.R. No. 171692, June 03, 2013

Civil law; Contract to sell; Rescission. In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid the price in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller’s ownership of the property prior to the full payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell.

In the case at bar, we find that respondent Rowena’s act of transferring the title to the subject land in her name, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-payment of the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the contract to sell. As previously noted, the main object or purpose of a seller in entering into a contract to sell is to protect himself against a buyer who intends to buy the property in installments by withholding ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment therefor. As a result, the seller’s obligation to convey and the buyer’s right to conveyance of the property arise only upon full payment of the price. Thus, a buyer who willfully contravenes this fundamental object or purpose of the contract, by covertly transferring the ownership of the property in his name at a time when the full purchase price has yet to be paid, commits a substantial and fundamental breach which entitles the seller to rescission of the contract.

Full text here.

ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 198755, June 05, 2013

Remedial law; Concurrent jurisdiction. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.

Remedial law; Estoppel. At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Full text here.

UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. v. MARIA RUBY M. RIVERA, G.R. No. 201701, June 03, 2013

Labor Law; Procedural rules in terminating the services of an employee. To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. “Reasonable opportunity “under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

In this case, Unilever was not direct and specific in its first notice to Rivera. The words it used were couched in general terms and were in no way informative of the charges against her that may result in her dismissal from employment. Evidently, there was a violation of her right to statutory due process warranting the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

Full text here.