Category Archives: Political Law


Political Law; The State may be sued if it consents, either expressly or impliedly. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, ‘the state may not be sued without its consent;’ it’s clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. x x x Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. ”Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

Full text here.


MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013

Political Law; The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus has its complicated side.

In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.

The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

Full text here.